It is argued that the emergence of controversial views in discussions of theoretical medicine and bioethics is best explained by the assumption of moral realism within those discursive practices. Neither of the main alternatives of realism in contemporary meta-ethics — moral expressivism and anti-realism — can account for the rise of controversies in the bioethical debate. This argument draws from the contemporary expressivist or anti-representationalist pragmatism as advanced by Richard Rorty and Huw Price, as well as the pragmatist scientific (...) realism and fallibilism of the founder of pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce. In accordance with the fallibilist view, it is proposed that presenting controversial positions may serve epistemic purposes within bioethical debates, providing opportunities for inquiry by pointing towards problems to be solved and arguments and evidence for and against to be put forward. (shrink)

Polish scholarly religious studies have their beginnings, as in many European countries, in the second half of the nineteenth century. They then developed in the spirit of positivism and evolutionism. Their genesis, as well as Western ones, was associated with a departure from the inherent romanticism of mythological comparative research methods, called Comparative Mythology, and a return to the study of religion in all its manifestations and aspects.

Scientific realism is a critical target of anti-representationalists such as Richard Rorty and Huw Price, who have questioned the very possibility of providing a satisfactory argument for realism or any other ontological position. I will argue that there is a viable form of realism which not only withstands this criticism but is vindicated on the antirepresentationalists’ own grounds. This realist position, largely drawn from the notion of the scientific method developed by the founder of philosophical pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce, (...) will further be compared with the accounts of truth and objectivity proposed by the contemporary pragmatists, Rorty, Price, and Robert B. Brandom. (shrink)

The rapid growth of cultural evolutionary science, its expansion into numerous fields, its use of diverse methods, and several conceptual problems have outpaced corollary developments in theory and philosophy of science. This has led to concern, exemplified in results from a recent survey conducted with members of the Cultural Evolution Society, that the field lacks ‘knowledge synthesis’, is poorly supported by ‘theory’, has an ambiguous relation to biological evolution and uses key terms (e.g. ‘culture’, ‘social learning’, ‘cumulative culture’) in ways (...) that hamper operationalization in models, experiments and field studies. Although numerous review papers in the field represent and categorize its empirical findings, the field's theoretical challenges receive less critical attention even though challenges of a theoretical or conceptual nature underlie most of the problems identified by Cultural Evolution Society members. Guided by the heterogeneous ‘grand challenges’ emergent in this survey, this paper restates those challenges and adopts an organizational style requisite to discussion of them. The paper's goal is to contribute to increasing conceptual clarity and theoretical discernment around the most pressing challenges facing the field of cultural evolutionary science. It will be of most interest to cultural evolutionary scientists, theoreticians, philosophers of science and interdisciplinary researchers. (shrink)

Replying to the variegated responses by theologian Langdon Gilkey, philosophers Richard McClelland and Robert Deltete, and biologist Rudolf B. Brun, I emphasize three elements of my theological use of autopoietic theory: (1) Autopoietic systems are less than self‐constitutive, since they do not create themselves from scratch, but more than self‐organizing, since they are capable of producing new elements inside the local system. Correspondingly, the theological importance of autopoietic theory is not found within the doctrine of a creation out of (...) nothing but within the doctrine of non‐uniform continuous creation. (2) Locating the concept of autopoiesis within third‐generation systems theory, I underline the pluriform character of type‐different systems; the possibility of giving a full causal account from the purview of any privileged single systems (including physics) is thus denied. (3) I distinguish between two complementary roles of theology in the dialogue between science and religion: whereas theology1 offers a participatory second‐order description of the internal meaning of particular traditions of faith, theology2 provides a third‐order inquiry into the external coherence between religious and nonreligious worlds of meaning. Theology2, however, always presupposes the internal descriptions of theology1. On this basis, my use of autopoietic theory is related to the theologies of creation and providence of Paul Tillich and Langdon Gilkey; likewise, I discuss various theological strategies for relating a theology of creation to standard interpretations of evolution. (shrink)

Categorical names such as “The English Novel,” “The Modern American Novel,” and “American Literature” often turn up in catalogs as titles of college courses, and we know from them pretty much what to expect. They also have standing in critical discourse, along with allied terms unlikely to serve as course titles: “good writing,” “great literature,” “serious fiction,” “literature” itself. The awareness has grown in recent years that such concepts pose problems, even though we use them with easy enough comprehension when (...) we talk or write to others who share our cultural matrix.Lately, critics like Raymond Williams have been reminding us that the categories change over time and that at any given moment categories embody complex social relations and a continuing historical process. That process deeply invests all terms with value: since not everyone’s values are the same, the negotiating of such concepts is, among other things, a struggle for dominance—whether between adults and the young, professors and their students, one class and another, or men and women. We don’t usually notice the power or the conflict, except when some previously weak or silent group seeks a share of the power: for example, when, in the 1960s, American blacks and their supporters insisted that black literature be included in school and college curricula, or when they openly challenged the candidacy of William Styron’s Confessions of Nat Turner for inclusion in some eventual canon.1 But the gradual firming up of concepts like, say, postwar American fiction is always a contest for cultural hegemony, even if in our society if is often muted—carried on behind the scenes or in the seemingly neutral marketplace. 1. See John Henrik Clarke, ed., William Styron’s Nat Turner: Ten Black Writers Respond . Richard Ohmann is professor of English at Wesleyan University. He is the author of English in America and is presently working on studies in mass culture. (shrink)

This book prints for the first time two remarkable interlocking sequences of letters between Paris and the Netherlands: 40 letters from Gilles Ménage in Paris to Johann-Georg Grævius in Utrecht, and 30 from the printer Henrik Wetstein, in Amsterdam, to Ménage. Their principal focus is the publication of a considerable number of Ménage's works outside France, above all his monumental edition of Diogenes Laertius's Lives of the Philosophers. The letters give an engaging picture of mutual help within the community (...) of scholars, Dutch, German, English, and French, including Huguenot exiles like Le Clerc and Bayle. Ménage's are full of information from Paris; while Wetstein's, forthright and humorous, concentrate on publishing details in a sometimes stormy relationship. The great Diogenes edition encountered an extraordinary range of problems: difficulties at every stage of publication, hazardous wartime communications, and, not least, a bizarrely eccentric collaborator in Marcus Meibomius. The two correspondences provide a fascinating case-study of the practical working of international scholarly publishing in time of war, and the European network of learned correspondence in the later seventeenth century. Each letter is printed in full, accompanied by a summary, detailed commentary, and extensive annotations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Minutes of the Annual General Meeting 2023Cornelis de Waal, Editor-in-Chief, Richard Kenneth Atkins, André De Tienne, Director and General Editor, and Elizabeth Cooke[as approved on January 17, 2024]The Annual General Meeting of the Charles S. Peirce Society was held in conjunction with the Eastern Division Meeting of the APA on January 5, 2023, at the Sheraton Le Centre, Montréal, Quebec. Rosa Maria Mayorga chaired the meeting and called (...) it to order at 12:38 p.m.1. Moment of SilenceThe annual meeting began with a moment of silence in memory of Peirce scholars who passed away in the last year.2. Approval of Minutes of the 2022 MeetingMinutes of the 2022 Annual General Meeting had been posted online. Copies were also distributed at the annual meeting. Rosa Maria Mayorga asked for a motion to approve the minutes. James Liszka so moved and Fabienne Forster seconded. The minutes were approved unanimously.3. Report from the Executive CommitteeRichard Kenneth Atkins submitted the following report.The Executive Committee Meeting was held virtually via email. All members of the Executive Committee were contacted and responded regarding the agenda and items.Agenda Items(A) Non-profit Status Update:On December 5, 2022, we received notification from the IRS that we have been legally approved as a public non-profit foundation.(B) Funding for Scholarship:Every year, we set aside a certain amount of funding for scholarship, usually 2/3rds of the year's income. This includes the $1,000 set aside for the Peirce Essay prize. Atkins reported that the income this past year was $6,597.06. 2/3rds of that is $4,400. Atkins requested that that amount of money be set aside for funding for scholarship, with which the committee unanimously agreed.(C) Next Year's AGM:Atkins proposed that we continue to hold our annual conference in conjunction with the E-APA in New York, NY, especially as this keeps us in line with the calendar year which is also our fiscal year as a nonprofit. The committee unanimously agreed. [End Page 118](D) Any Other Business:Cornelis de Waal suggested that we add to the agenda for the annual business meeting a moment of silence to commemorate Peirce scholars who passed this year. The Executive Committee unanimously agreed.4. Report from the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce SocietyCornelis de Waal submitted the following report on behalf of the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Richard Kenneth Atkins read the report on his behalf.During the 2022 calendar year we produced four issues of the Transactions. We encountered some problems with the first issue, because the printer suffered a ransomware attack. This apparently wreaked havoc with their system and caused significant delay in the completion of the issue.Likely due to the (after) effects of the pandemic, quality submissions to the journal were down significantly, both in the Peirce segment and in the non-Peirce segment of the journal. In addition, there was a significant drop in book reviews. The latter led to the resignation of our long-term book review editor, Henrik Rydenfelt. For the last two months I have been taking over for him, and I'm first-hand experiencing some of the challenges, even including publishers simply not following through on requests for books. We did, though, publish a book symposium on James Liszka's Charles Peirce on Ethics, Esthetics and the Normative Sciences, and we have another book symposium forthcoming on Chris Voparil's Reconstructing Pragmatism: Richard Rorty and the Classical Pragmatists. Besides a number of excellent papers on Peirce, we published some very nice papers in American philosophy. The latter include an extensive portrait of Edwin Bissell Holt, a discussion of the use of the term pragmatism in 18th century Germany, the first English translation of two texts by Wilhelm Jerusalem, as well as work on George Santayana, Jonathan Edwards, and Emily Dickinson.With Henrik gone, the editorial team is now down to Robert Lane and me (hopefully briefly returning to the traditional Robin-Hare setup). I'll be attending the upcoming SAAP meeting in Denver, and Bob is planning to attend as well... (shrink)

Cognitive science is experiencing a pragmatic turn away from the traditional representation-centered framework toward a view that focuses on understanding cognition as "enactive." This enactive view holds that cognition does not produce models of the world but rather subserves action as it is grounded in sensorimotor skills. In this volume, experts from cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, robotics, and philosophy of mind assess the foundations and implications of a novel action-oriented view of cognition. Their contributions and supporting experimental evidence show that (...) an enactive approach to cognitive science enables strong conceptual advances, and the chapters explore key concepts for this new model of cognition. The contributors discuss the implications of an enactive approach for cognitive development; action-oriented models of cognitive processing; action-oriented understandings of consciousness and experience; and the accompanying paradigm shifts in the fields of philosophy, brain science, robotics, and psychology. ContributorsMoshe Bar, Lawrence W. Barsalov, Olaf Blanke, Jeannette Bohg, Martin V. Butz, Peter F. Dominey, Andreas K. Engel, Judith M. Ford, Karl J. Friston, Chris D. Frith, Shaun Gallagher, Antonia Hamilton, Tobias Heed, Cecilia Heyes, Elisabeth Hill, Matej Hoffmann, Jakob Hohwy, Bernhard Hommel, Atsushi Iriki, Pierre Jacob, Henrik Jörntell, Jürgen Jost, James Kilner, Günther Knoblich, Peter König, Danica Kragic, Miriam Kyselo, Alexander Maye, Marek McGann, Richard Menary, Thomas Metzinger, Ezequiel Morsella, Saskia Nagel, Kevin J. O'Regan, Pierre-Yves Oudeyer, Giovanni Pezzulo, Tony J. Prescott, Wolfgang Prinz, Friedemann Pulvermüller, Robert Rupert, Marti Sanchez-Fibla, Andrew Schwartz, Anil K. Seth, Vicky Southgate, Antonella Tramacere, John K. Tsotsos, Paul F. M. J. Verschure, Gabriella Vigliocco, Gottfried Vosgerau. (shrink)

What does it mean to be visually literate? Does it mean different things in the arts and the sciences? In the West, in Asia, or in developing nations? If we all need to become "visually literate," what does that mean in practical terms? The essays gathered here examine a host of issues surrounding "the visual," exploring national and regional ideas of visuality and charting out new territories of visual literacy that lie far beyond art history, such as law and chemistry. (...) With an afterword by Christopher Crouch, this groundbreaking collection brings together the work of major art and visual studies scholars and critics to explore what impact the new concept of "visual literacy" will have on the traditional field of art history. Contributors: Matthias Bruhn, Vera Dünkel, Jonathan Crary, Christopher Crouch, Peter Dallow, James Elkins, Henrik Enquist, W.J.T. Mitchell, Richard K. Sherwin, Susan Shifrin, Jon Simons, Barbara Maria Stafford, William Washabaugh. (shrink)

Some theorists who accept the existence of global justice duties to alleviate the condition of distant needy strangers hold that these duties are significantly constrained by special ties to fellow countrymen. The patriotic priority thesis holds that morality requires the members of each nation-state to give priority to helping needy fellow compatriots over more needy distant strangers. Three arguments for constraint and patriotic priority are examined in this essay: an argument from fair play, one from coercion, another from coercion and (...) autonomy. Under scrutiny, none of these arguments qualifies as successful. (shrink)

Academic freedom and tenure, both cherished institutions of higher education, are currently under attack by many both outside and within the academy. Richard DeGeorge argues that they can be defended on ethical grounds only if they are joined with appropriate accountability, publicly articulated and defended standards, and conscientious enforcement of these standards by academic institutions and the members of the academic community.

Objective: The objective of this study was to evaluate the psychometric properties of the Chinese version of the decision regret scale. Methods: The data of 704 patients who completed the DRSc were used for the analyses. We evaluated the construct, convergent/discriminant, and known-group validity; internal consistency and test–retest reliability; and the item invariance of the DRSc. A receiver operating characteristic curve was employed to confirm the optimal cutoff point of the scale. Results: A confirmatory factor analysis indicated that a one-factor (...) model fits the data. The internal consistency and test–retest reliability [intraclass correlation coefficient = 0.71] of the DRSc were acceptable. The DRSc demonstrated unidimensionality and invariance for use across the sexes. It was confirmed that an optimal cutoff point of 25 could discriminate between patients with high and low decisional regret during clinical practice. Conclusion: The DRSc is a parsimonious instrument that can be used to measure the uncertainty inherent in medical decisions. It can be employed to provide knowledge, offer support, and elicit patient preferences in an attempt to promote shared decision-making. (shrink)

Richard Rorty (1931–2007) was one of the most provocative and controversial philosophers of the past 50 years. He had a rare ability to combine sophisticated arguments with wit, charm, and humor. He was never dull – and he reached a wide public throughout the world. Originally trained in the history of philosophy and the grand tradition of metaphysics, he became fascinated with the linguistic turn in philosophy. During his early philosophical career, he wrote articles that were at the cutting (...) edge of analytic philosophy. He developed a new approach to the mind-body problem and raised troubling questions about the viability of the conceptual analysis of ordinary language. Soon, he began to question what he called the “Kantian foundations” of analytic philosophy. In 1979, he published Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, a book that became an immediate sensation. Rorty, employing ingenious arguments, questioned the basis of analytic philosophy, and more generally the very idea of systematic philosophy. He called into question the Descartes-Locke-Kant tradition and claimed that the metaphor of the “mirror of nature” had misled philosophers into thinking that the task of philosophy is to “get things right” by representing objective reality. In the mid-twentieth century, the analytic-continental split in philosophy became bitterly entrenched. Many Anglo-American philosophers were convinced that linguistic analytic philosophy is “the only game in town.” They disdained what they took to be the lack of clarity and argumentative rigor among continental thinkers. The “compliment” was returned by continental thinkers who thought that much of analytic philosophy was trivial and insignificant. Rorty employed clever analytic techniques to challenge the pretentions of analytic philosophy. Many of his professional colleagues were furious. At the same time, Rorty engaged thinkers like Sartre, Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas, Derrida, and Foucault. This delighted aficionados of continental philosophy – although they frequently judged his interpretations of these thinkers to be distorted caricatures. Rorty was one of the rare philosophers who transcended the analytic-continental split. At the same time, Rorty increasingly identified himself with the American pragmatic tradition. He entitled his 1982 collection of essays, “Consequences of Pragmatism,” which included his famous 1979 presidential address to the American Philosophical Association: “‘Pragmatism’ is a vague, ambiguous, and overworked word. Nevertheless it names the glory of our country’s intellectual tradition. No other American writers have offered so radical suggestion for making our future different from the past, as have James and Dewey” (Rorty 1982, p. 160). Rorty helped to revive a serious interest in James and Dewey. In the Introduction to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, he declared that the three most important philosophers of the twentieth century were Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey. Analytic philosophers might agree about the importance of Wittgenstein; continental thinkers might acknowledge the importance of Heidegger; but virtually no professional philosopher (except devotees of Dewey) would have ranked Dewey with the other two. Rorty claimed that each of these three thinkers had originally sought to find a new way to make philosophy “foundational,” but they came to realize that their earlier work was self-deceptive and they spent the rest of their time warning us against the temptations to which they had succumbed. “Their later work is therapeutic rather than constructive, edifying rather than systematic, designed to make the reader question his own motives for philosophizing rather than supply him with a new philosophical program.” (Rorty 1979, pp. 5–6) Rorty acknowledged that Dewey lacked Wittgenstein’s “dialectical acuity” and Heidegger’s “historical learning,” but Dewey articulated a vision of a new type of society. “In his ideal society, culture is no longer dominated by the ideal of objective cognition but by that of aesthetic enhancement. In that culture, as he said, the arts and sciences would be the ‘unforced flowers of life.” (Rorty 1979, p. 13) This was also Rorty’s vision of a liberal utopia. He developed this vision in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, where the central figure becomes the liberal ironist. Whereas Philosophy and the Mirror and Nature was filled with brilliant (although controversial) arguments, Rorty now debunked the role of argument in philosophy. “On the view of philosophy which I am offering, philosophers should not be asked for arguments against, for example, the correspondence theory of truth or the idea of the ‘intrinsic nature of reality’.” (Rorty 1989, p. 8) He favored redescription rather than argument. “I am not going to offer arguments against the vocabulary I want to replace. Instead, I am going to try to make the vocabulary I favor look attractive by showing how it may redescribe a variety of topics.” (Rorty 1989, p. 9) Interesting philosophy is not really a matter of argument at all but rather “a contrast between an entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a half-formed vocabulary which vaguely promises great things” (Rorty 1989, p. 9). Rorty deflated what many philosophers took to be the central concerns of philosophy, the nature of truth, reality, objectivity, knowledge, and morality. He sought to replace the appeal to objectivity with the appeal of solidarity. He is famous for his slogan “Take care of freedom and truth will take care of itself” (Rorty 1989, p. 176). Even admirers of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature were distressed by the radical turn of Contingency where he suggested that novels, journalism, and literary reflection might be more effective than philosophical argumentation in bringing about his liberal utopia. Some of his fiercest critics claimed that Rorty could no longer be taken seriously as a philosopher. Contingency was savagely criticized and ridiculed, so much so that Rorty was provoked to write his revealing and delightful autobiographical sketch, “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids.” “I am sometimes told, by critics from both ends of the political spectrum, that my views are so weird as to be merely frivolous. They suspect that I will say anything to get a gasp, that I am just amusing myself by contradicting everybody else. This hurts. So I have tried, in what follows, to say something about how I got into my present position—how I got into philosophy, and then found myself unable to use philosophy for the purpose I had originally in mind.” (Rorty 1999, p. 5) What follows is an account of how Rorty grew up in a family that was deeply committed to furthering social justice. (“Trotsky” is a synecdoche for social justice.) Rorty also tells of his early nerdish love of the wild orchids of New Jersey. (“Wild orchids” is the synecdoche for private pleasures.) When Rorty became interested in philosophy, he wanted to find some intellectual or esthetic framework that would hold reality and justice in a single vision – one that would integrate social justice and private idiosyncratic pleasures. He tells the story of his eventual discovery that there was no such overarching framework and his growing realization that there was no need for such a framework. As a public citizen, one can be deeply committed to advancing social justice and at the same time, as a private person, enjoy idiosyncratic pleasures. There is no need to reconcile or synthesize these two incommensurable dimensions of human life. (shrink)

In this first complete account of Hartley's thought, Richard C. Allen explains Hartley's theories of physiology, perception and action, language and cognition, emotional development and transformation, and spiritual transcendence. By drawing a biographical portrait of its subject, the book explores the relationship of mind and body in Hartley's system, and surveys Hartley's influence upon later scientists and social reformers, particularly Joseph Priestley.

Volume 24 of _The Annual_ opens with a memorial tribute to the late Merton M. Gill, a major voice in American psychoanalysis for half a century. Remembrances of Gill by Robert Holt, Robert Wallerstein, Philip Holzman, and Irwin Hoffman are followed by thoughtful appreciations of Gill's final book, _Psychoanalysis in Transition: A Personal View_, by John Gedo, Jerome Oremland, Arnold Richards and Arthur Lynch, Joseph Schachter, and Bhaskar Sripada and Shara Kronmal. Section II offers four papers from a major conference (...) on "Mind/Brain" held in Osaka, Japan. In addition to publishing two clinical papers by the Chicago analyst John Gedo, _The Annual_ introduces readers to two prominent Japanese neuroscientists whose work is relevant to psychoanalysis. Hiroshi Utena links brain development to the individual's freedom to make optimal adaptive choices, whereas Makoto Iwata outlines the modular organization of vision in the brain and then illustrates each modular potential by examining the paintings of four artists: Mondrian, Duchamp, Seurat, and Rothko. Kenneth Newman's sensitive consideration of analyst self-discourse as the outcome of successful management of the countertransference and Frank Summers' astute assessment of the place of self psychology in the history of psychoanalytic ideas are followed by three engaging and instructive studies in applied analysis: Elaine Caruth and Milton Eber's examination of Woody Allen's _The Purple Rose of Cairo _as a metaphoric depiction of the blurring of boundaries in psychotherapy; Frank and Annette Lachmann's study of the creative process of Henrik Ibsen as a self-transformational response to narcissistic injury; and W. W. Meissner's exploration of the role of shame in Vincent van Gogh's life and art. The volume concludes with a provocative contribution to psychoanalytic history: J. Bos's social-constructivist rereading of the _Minutes of the Vienna Psycho-Analytic Society_ with an eye to illuminating why and how psychoanalysis changed during its early years. True to its distinguished lineage, volume 24 of _The Annual_ continues to broaden the conceptual, clinical, and historical vistas of its readers. Moreover, with its revealing reminiscences and substantive appraisals of Merton Gill, this volume becomes a fascinating marker in the very psychoanalytic history it helps recount. (shrink)

Reasoning can promote psychological development, so even if the role of philosophical counselor is defined strictly in terms of assisting the reasoning of the client, we can expect client-centered philosophical inquiry to yield psychological benefits. The practices of philosophical counseling and psychotherapy permeate one another to some degree while also diverging in characteristic focus. Philosophical counselors are particularly well suited to helping clients think through their situation in the world.

This is the first full exploration of the implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy for understanding the arts and cultural criticism. These original essays by philosophers and critics address key philosophical topics in the study of the arts and culture, such as humanism, criticism, psychology, painting, film and ethics. All exemplify Wittgenstein's method of conceptual investigation and highlight his notion of philosophy as a cure.

The political passages in Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge are an integral part of his arguments against ‘objectivism’ and/or a post-critical, personalist, fiduciary and fallibilist philosophy. This paper elaboratesthe social and political implications of Polanyi’s emphasis upon acceptance of one’s situation and the exercise in it of a sense of responsibility to transcendent ideals, as against attempts to start with a clean slate, to overcome all imperfections and to find some simple rule for political policy. Prescriptive duties and rights, and mutual trust (...) and solidarity, are the bases of politics, anti responsible action must start with them. But much of modern politics expresses a Gnostic impatience of our created and finite existence which results in arbitrary commitment to some radical and destructive ideology. (shrink)

This book brings recent developments in Anglo-American philosophy into engagement with dominant currents in contemporary European social theory in order to articulate a pragmatic account of moral criticism. Presented in a lively and accessible style that avoids technical jargon, Morality and Social Criticism argues that the objectivity of moral discourse can be preserved without recourse to the overweening philosophical ambitions of the Enlightenment.

Richard J. Arneson From Choice to Chance: Genes and the Just Society1 intelligently addresses difficult issues at the intersection of medical ethics and the theory of justice. The authors, Dan Brock, Allen Buchanan, Norman Daniels, and Daniel Wikler, repeatedly emphasize their opinion that advances in genetic technology force upon us entirely new ethical questions which previous moral theories lack the resources to resolve.2 The claims that new scientific discoveries render previous moral theories obsolete should be regarded with suspicion. The (...) reader’s suspicion should be further aroused when she notes another feature of the authors’ theorizing that neatly fits the claim that we stand at the dawn of a new world of ethical theorizing. The authors’ discussion from start to finish stays at a middle level. By this I mean that the authors in each chapter begin with a few moral principles taken to be plausible or possibly plausible and examine their implications for issues raised by new genetic technology.3 This is not an exercise in applied ethics, because the principles initially invoked are subjected to criticism and scrutiny. But in almost every significant case the results are inconclusive. The moral puzzles that are raised are left unsolved, with moral reasons pointing toward opposed conclusions and the.. (shrink)

Richard Barrett; Initiation and Inhibition, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 73–81, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-975.

Although any generalization in matters of such scope is risky, the central issue involved would seem to be this: Can man achieve, and know that he has achieved, a true and adequate philosophy? The Jesuit tendency is to stress the developmental aspects of philosophy and theology, identifying them more closely with the natural sciences. The Dominicans, on the other hand, see in this tendency great dangers, with theological pluralism as perhaps the gravest, short of outright skepticism.

Following the rediscovery of Mendelian genetics, food supply pressures and the rapid expansion of crop varieties with defined performance characteristics, international systems were set up throughout the 20 C to regulate the trade of seed, the protection of intellectual property and the sale of productive varieties of key agricultural crops. These systems are a highly connected but largely linear set of processes. System changes are slow to be adopted due to the cascade of effects that structural alteration would have globally. (...) Multi-omic technologies and the subsequent proliferation of data types used within modern breeding, offer the possibility to gain deeper insights into the performance characteristics of varieties. Current integration of data, standards and ownership structures limit their applications for wider purposes, both private and public. We explore how data within and between breeding programmes and the varietal approval and monitoring processes could be made FAIR. We examine what role expanded or aligned programmes of data collection and expanded trait evaluation at the point of varietal registration and evaluation, as well as on farm could have in ensuring the best linkage of public and private data to address some of the challenges society faces over the next 30 years with the required, rapid transition to sustainable agricultural systems. (shrink)

But educational reflection of social rigidity lessens labor force's efficiency.